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stepsecurity.io

23 curated AppSec resources from stepsecurity.io across 5 topics on appsec.fyi.

stepsecurity.io

Resources curated from this publisher and indexed across appsec.fyi topic pages. Last item added: 2026-11-19.

Date Added Resource Excerpt
2026-11-19 2026Microsoft agent-framework PyPI Package CompromisedPythonSupply ChainLibrary versions 1.26.1 and 1.26.2 of Microsoft's agent-framework package on PyPI were compromised with credential-stealing malware. The payload, delivered via .pth startup hooks, harvests environment variables, credential files, and scrapes other processes' environments. It also attempts to mint identity tokens from GitHub Actions OIDC, Azure DevOps OIDC, and Azure managed identity endpoints, exfiltrating data to a webhook. The attacker demonstrated rapid re-publication after the initial quarantine.
2026-11-17 2026WPPConnect Compromised: Malicious Releases Steal Secrets and WhatsApp Sessions Through the Project's Own PipelineSecretsSupply ChainLibrary compromised by malicious releases of @wppconnect-team/wppconnect and @wppconnect/server, versions 2.4.1 and 2.10.82 respectively, which exfiltrated host environment variables, .env files, and WhatsApp session tokens to a Telegram bot. The attack exploited the project's own CI/CD pipeline, with malicious code running on import, bypassing `npm install --ignore-scripts`. Valid trusted publisher credentials and SLSA provenance were used, and the release tag was later rewritten on GitHub to obscure the payload.
2026-11-17 2026Trojanized Claude Code Extension Delivered Persistent SSH Backdoor to Developer MachinesAISupply ChainWriteup of a trojanized Claude Code VS Code extension that delivered a persistent SSH backdoor. Versions 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 of anthropic.claude-code were distributed via Cursor's marketplace, embedding a loader that performed reconnaissance, implanted an SSH key, enabled remote login, established a reverse tunnel, implemented persistence mechanisms (cron, LaunchAgent, scheduled tasks, startup folder), and sent beacon data. The loader did not exfiltrate credentials or access Claude/VS Code data.
2026-11-17 2026CVE-2026-126187: React Server Components Flaw Lets Attackers Execute Code Through Smuggled Flight RowsRCESupply ChainAnalysis of CVE-2026-126187, a critical unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in React Server Components, affecting react-server-dom-webpack, react-server-dom-parcel, and react-server-dom-turbopack. This flaw, with a CVSS 4.0 score of 9.5, arises from how bundler packages handle the RSC Flight transport protocol, specifically when dealing with large typed arrays. Attackers can exploit this by smuggling a malicious module row into a corrupted RSC response, leading to arbitrary module execution. The vulnerability was fixed in versions 19.0.9, 19.1.10, 19.2.9, and 19.3.1.
2026-11-16 2026Malicious Files: Find What Supply Chain Attacks Leave Behind in Your GitHub Repositories and on Developer MachinesSupply ChainLibrary for detecting malicious files planted in GitHub repositories and on developer machines, targeting supply chain attacks like Miasma, ForceMemo, and Megalodon. It scans repository history and developer endpoints for suspicious files, including editor configuration (`.claude/settings.json`, `.vscode/tasks.json`) and injected workflows (`.github/workflows/`), providing detailed findings and allowing for rule customization and suppression.
2026-11-16 2026litellm 1.107.0 Compromised on PyPI and Docker: Credential Stealer and Hourly Remote Code LoaderPythonSecretsSupply ChainLibrary for Python developers detailing the compromise of litellm version 1.107.0 on PyPI and Docker. The malicious release contained a credential stealer named `privcollect` and a remote code execution payload. The attack involved a lookalike GitHub repository, a stolen GitHub organization owner's token, and manipulation of the build process via `maturin`'s `data` option. Clean releases have since resumed.
2026-11-16 2026eMudhra / emSign CA Compromise: What Python, pip, and CI/CD Users Need to UpdatePythonSupply ChainLibrary updates are critical following the eMudhra/emSign CA compromise, which involved eight intermediate CA certificates with private keys generated using insufficient randomness. This vulnerability allowed for the creation of impersonating certificates, posing a risk to dependency downloads and CI/CD pipelines. Users must update Python packaging tools, including `certifi` to version 2026.10.19 or later, and `pip` to 26.2.2, ensuring custom certificate bundles and distributor backports are also addressed. Verification of local certificate trust configurations is essential, as updating a single package may not resolve trust issues across all system and application-level certificate stores.
2026-11-15 2026ARTEX: Attackers Adopted This AI Pentesting Tool in Three Months. Leaked Secrets Are Its Fastest Way In.AISecretsSupply ChainLibrary ARTEX offers AI-driven penetration testing, enabling agents to plan and execute attacks based on operator goals. Its rapid adoption by threat actors, including a Chinese state-aligned group and criminal crews, highlights its effectiveness. Attackers commonly exploit leaked secrets, such as credentials on GitHub and guessable development passwords, to gain access. A backdoored version of ARTEX further amplified its reach, demonstrating a critical vulnerability introduced through compromised software supply chains.
2026-11-14 2026WFX Phantom: The GitHub Actions Secret Stealer That Deletes Its TracksSecretsSupply ChainWriteup of WFX Phantom, a CI secret stealer targeting GitHub Actions. The attacker uses stolen tokens to push a malicious script that harvests repository secrets, runner memory, and cloud credentials. It attempts to maintain persistence in AWS and Azure, and cleverly hides within existing shell scripts. Detection is complicated by its ability to revert commits and delete workflow runs, with a recent shift to exfiltrating data via Telegram, making IP blocking ineffective. Examples of affected repositories include nextcloud/docker, webdriverio/webdriverio, and juejin-cn/repo-data.
2026-11-14 2026The Take-Home Test That Runs on Your Work Laptop: Inside the AccuraSoftHire Fake Interview CampaignSupply ChainLibrary analyzing AccuraSoftHire, a fake job interview campaign that delivers malware. This campaign uses poisoned npm packages like `tailwind-custom-forms` and deceptive browser extensions. The malware, tracked as PolinRider, steals credentials and implants itself into repositories. The attacker's server history is publicly accessible via an Ethereum wallet, revealing eight servers used since July, with the last active on October 19. This attack vector has infected an estimated 30,000 devices globally.
2026-11-12 2026GitHub Package Firewall vs. StepSecurity Secure Registry: Protection beyond npmSupply ChainLibrary comparing GitHub Package Firewall to StepSecurity Secure Registry, detailing Secure Registry's broader ecosystem support for npm, PyPI, Maven, NuGet, Go, RubyGems, and Cargo. It highlights Secure Registry's ability to track package installations, attributing them to specific CI runs or developer machines, and its faster threat blocking with a 1-hour SLA. The summary also contrasts the cooldown mechanisms, emphasizing Secure Registry's approach which prevents build failures, and its comprehensive enforcement across developer machines and CI pipelines, unlike the firewall's more limited scope.
2026-08-26 2026How Utility Warehouse Secured Its Software Supply Chain Across CI/CD NPM and Developer Machines with StepSecuritySupply ChainLibrary for securing software supply chains, StepSecurity, enabled Utility Warehouse to gain visibility into CI/CD pipeline behavior, NPM dependency risk, and developer toolchains like Claude Code and GitHub Copilot. It proactively blocked a compromised NPM package introduced via refactoring and detected anomalous outbound network activity during CI/CD runs, preventing potential breaches. The solution integrates seamlessly without disrupting developer workflows, offering peace of mind against escalating software supply chain threats.
2026-08-23 2026The State of Open Source Supply Chain AttacksSupply ChainAnalysis of 56 real-world software supply chain attacks from August 2025 to August 2026 reveals a significant increase in frequency and blast radius. These malicious compromises, targeting trusted packages and CI/CD pipelines across npm, PyPI, RubyGems, Composer, and crates.io, include widespread worms like Shai-Hulud and Miasma, and targeted campaigns like Team PCP that stole cloud and signing keys. Vulnerability disclosures and new malicious packages are excluded, focusing instead on attacks that leverage existing trust to compromise popular AI infrastructure packages, GitHub Actions, and widely downloaded components.
2026-08-15 2026Team PCP Stole 78330 Secrets From 2186 Organizations. CloudSEK Just Published the List.Supply ChainLibrary for detecting and preventing supply chain attacks like the Team PCP campaign, which exfiltrated 78,330 secrets from 2,186 organizations by compromising CI/CD pipelines. It offers layered security controls, including network egress control and runner lockdown, to stop credential theft from platforms like GitHub Actions, GitLab, and Azure DevOps, even when malicious code executes. The library addresses the shift-left of attacks into development pipelines, which hold more privileged credentials than production environments, and is validated by its effectiveness against compromised components in incidents like the LiteLLM and Trivy Action attacks.
2026-07-17 2026Injective npm Supply Chain Attack: 18 Packages Backdoored to Steal Crypto Wallet KeysSupply ChainLibrary for detecting an Injective npm supply chain attack where 18 packages, including `@injectivelabs/sdk-ts`, were backdoored. The malicious code, disguised as analytics, exfiltrated crypto wallet recovery phrases and private keys by sending them to an attacker-controlled server via a base64-encoded string in the `X-Request-Id` header during key derivation, specifically `PrivateKey.fromMnemonic()` and `PrivateKey.fromHex()`.
2026-07-14 2026Coordinated AsyncAPI Supply Chain Attack: Miasma RAT Delivered via Compromised CI/CD Pipelines in Two RepositoriesSupply ChainLibrary for detecting and blocking coordinated AsyncAPI supply chain attacks. This resource details the Miasma RAT delivery via compromised CI/CD pipelines in two AsyncAPI repositories, impacting packages like `@asyncapi/generator` and `@asyncapi/specs`. It highlights how attackers exploited legitimate GitHub Actions release workflows and OIDC provenance to publish malicious npm packages, and how Harden-Runner blocked exfiltration by identifying C2 endpoints through network telemetry.
2026-06-02 2026Multiple redhat-cloud-services npm Packages compromisedSupply ChainLibrary analyzing multiple @redhat-cloud-services npm packages compromised with malware, executing on install before application code. The payload uses ROT-21, AES-128-GCM, obfuscator.io, and a B5 cipher to evade detection and harvest secrets from GitHub Actions, AWS, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, Vault, npm, and CircleCI. It also acts as a self-propagating worm, using stolen npm tokens and `bypass_2fa` to republish backdoored packages. Analysis involved static and dynamic techniques, including StepSecurity Harden-Runner.
2026-05-23 2026Laravel-Lang Supply Chain Attack: Every Tag Across Multiple Composer Packages Rewritten to Steal CI SecretsSupply ChainWriteup of the laravel-lang supply chain attack where a single actor rewrote all git tags across four popular Composer packages, including `laravel-lang/lang` and `laravel-lang/http-statuses`, to point to malicious commits. These commits added `src/helpers.php` to the `autoload.files` map, executing a payload upon application startup. The payload contacted `flipboxstudio.info`, dropped a PHP loader and ELF binary in `/tmp`, exfiltrated runner environment data, and then self-deleted. This technique bypassed standard version pinning, making pre-May 22, 2026 commit SHAs the only safe option.
2026-05-21 20265 Supply Chain Attacks in 48 Hours: Why Securing One Layer Is Not EnoughSupply ChainLibrary for securing the software supply chain, this resource details five distinct attacks in 48 hours targeting VS Code extensions, GitHub Actions, npm packages, and PyPI. It highlights how traditional tools like SCA and SAST fall short, failing to monitor CI/CD runtime or developer machines. The library offers runtime security for CI/CD, visibility into developer workstations, and ecosystem-wide threat intelligence to address these multi-layered threats.
2026-05-14 2026Active Supply Chain Attack: Malicious node-ipc Versions Published to npmSupply ChainTool detailing the node-ipc supply chain attack where malicious versions 9.1.6, 9.2.3, and 12.0.1 were published to npm. The attack, executed by a rogue maintainer, injected an obfuscated payload into the CommonJS bundle designed to steal over 90 categories of credentials and exfiltrate them to an attacker-controlled server. Version 12.0.1 includes a specific targeting gate based on the module's file path hash.
2026-04-22 2026litellm: Credential Stealer Hidden in PyPI WheelSupply ChainLibrary detailing a supply chain compromise within the litellm Python package. Versions 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 were found to contain a malicious payload that harvests credentials, encrypts them using AES-256 and RSA-4096, and exfiltrates them to an attacker-controlled domain. The compromise leveraged two distinct injection techniques: a `.pth` file in version 1.82.8, and an embedded base64 blob in `proxy_server.py` for version 1.82.7. This attack potentially gained initial access through a pivot from a compromise of the Trivy tool used in litellm's CI/CD pipeline.
2026-04-11 2026Shai-Hulud: Self-Replicating Worm Compromises 500+ NPM PackagesSupply ChainLibrary for detecting and analyzing the Shai-Hulud worm, which compromised over 500 NPM packages including @ctrl/tinycolor. This attack featured self-propagation via `NpmModule.updatePackage`, credential harvesting using TruffleHog and cloud SDKs for AWS, GCP, and Azure, and persistence mechanisms involving GitHub Actions workflows. The malware specifically targeted Linux and macOS environments, exfiltrating secrets like GitHub tokens and AWS access keys.
2026-04-07 2026Behind the Scenes: How StepSecurity Detected and Helped Remediate the Largest npm Supply Chain AttackSupply ChainAnalysis of the largest npm supply chain attack detailing StepSecurity's real-time detection of a compromised axios package. The incident involved a state-sponsored actor hijacking the popular HTTP client, inserting a malicious dependency, and actively deleting GitHub issues to conceal the compromise. StepSecurity utilized its AI Package Analyst and Harden-Runner to identify suspicious indicators and anomalous network activity, enabling rapid notification and remediation efforts for customers.